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United States v. Atlantic Research: The Supreme Court Almost
Gets It Right
by Jeffrey M. Gaba
Editors'Summary: Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, a 2004 U.S. Supreme
Court case, challenged the legal community's understanding of rights of cost
recovery under CERCLA, ruling that PRPs who voluntarily cleaned up prop-
erty did not have a cause ofaction in contribution under §113(f). However ear-
lier this year in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Court held that
PRPs who voluntarily clean up contaminated properties may have a right ofre-
covery under §§ 107(a) (4) (B) or 113(). In this Article, Jeffrey M. Gaba explores
the issues left unresolved or convoluted by these two opinions. He begins with
background on the private rights of cost recovery under CERCLA, and then
parses these two decisions. He concludes by encouraging the Court to recon-
cile the different parts of CERCLA to create a coherent set of rights to cost re-
covery for PRPs.
I n United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,I a unanimousU.S. Suprem  Court held that § 107(a)(4)(B) ofthe Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)2 provides a direct right of cost re-
covery to potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who volun-
tarily clean up property. For those of us raised on CERCLA,
this would seem an unremarkable proposition. For the first
20 years of CERCLA's existence, it was universally held
that PRPs had a right of cost recovery. Following the adop-
tion of an express right of contribution in § 113(f), there was
some confusion about the appropriate cause of action that a
PRP should assert, and most courts held that PRPs could
only sue in contribution under § 113(f). But that a right of
cost recovery of some sort existed was an article of faith.
Countless millions ofdollars changed hands on this proposi-
tion; countless real estate transactions were negotiated
based on this assumption.
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court taught us the limits
of faith. In Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services,3 the Su-
preme Court upset this widely held assumption by holding
that PRPs who voluntarily cleaned up property did not have
a cause of action in contribution under § l13(f). Given prior
case law limiting PRPs to an action under § 113, there was
reason to believe that a right of cost recovery under
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2. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675, ELR STAT. CERCLA §§101-405.
3. 543 U.S. 157, 34 ELR 20154 (2004).
CERCLA would no longer be available to PRPs who volun-
tarily remediated contaminated property. CERCLA's pow-
erful incentive to clean contaminated property without gov-
emment involvement was in question.
In Atlantic Research, the Court restored our faith. Fol-
lowing Cooper Industries and Atlantic Research, it seems
clear that PRPs who voluntarily clean up property have a di-
rect right of cost recovery under § 107(a)(4)(B) and PRPs
who have reimbursed costs paid by other PRPs or the gov-
emment through a civil action or government settlement
have a right of contribution under §113(f).
The Supreme Court got it right. Almost. There are a num-
ber ofissues that still lurk in the interstices ofthese opinions.
These include the proper cause of action to be asserted by
PRPs who expend money to remediate property under a
government administrative order or as part of a government
settlement. Further, the Court's treatment of the issue has
raised real concerns about the ffectiveness of "contribution
protection" that has been a cornerstone of settlements with
the government. Atlantic Research as revived the right of
private cost recovery under CERCLA, but there are still
matters to be resolved.
I. The Private Rights of Cost Recovery Under
CERCLA
When CERCLA was adopted in 1980, its liability provi-
sions were contained in § 107. Section 107(a)(1)-(4) defined
the four classes of PRPs and provided that they wouldbe lia-
ble for: (1) all response costs incurred by the federal and
state governments not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan (NCP); and (2) any other necessary response
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costs incurred by "any other person" consistent with the
NCP.4 PRP liability under § 107 was held to be strict and
joint and several.5
There was no doubt that under §107(a)(4)(A) the gov-
ernment could recover its cleanup costs from PRPs. Fur-
ther, in the first years following adoption of CERCLA,
courts generally held that parties who were themselves
PRPs could sue under § 107(a)(4)(B) to recover their clean-
up costs.6 The courts allowed PRPs to recover their costs
under §107 even if the cleanup was voluntary and without
government involvement.7
Courts, however, perceived a problem. PRPs who had not
cleaned up property but who were being held liable in cost
recovery actions under § 107 were seeking cost recovery
from other PRPs. This arose either in litigation by PRPs who
had previously been held liable in an earlier § 107 action or
by PRPs who brought third-party claims against other PRPs
in an original § 107 action. In a number of these cases, fed-
eral courts found that PRPs who had been held liable (or
who were being sued) had an implied right of contribution to
seek an allocation of costs with other PRPs.8 The implica-
tion of a right of contribution also provided a basis for an eq-
uitable allocation of costs among PRPs where liability under
§ 107 was otherwise joint and several.
There was, however, a problem with this implied right of
contribution. The Supreme Court in two nonenvironmental
cases had substantially limited the ability of federal courts to
fashion federal implied rights of contribution, and the le-
gitimacy ofthe CERCLA implied right of contribution was
in doubt.9
In the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA), the U.S. Congress "clarified and confirmed"




See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 19 ELR
20085 (4th Cir. 1988). The imposition of "joint and several" liability
under § 107 arises not from an express statutory provision, but from
legislative history indicating that CERCLA was to be interpreted in
accordance with "traditional and evolving" principles of common
law. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 13
ELR 20986 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The Supreme Court, however, has in-
dicated that courts may have the authority to impose other than joint
and several liability under § 107. CooperIndus., 543 U.S. at 169-70.
6. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887,
16 ELR 20754 (9th Cir. 1986); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co.,
544 F. Supp. 1135, 12 ELR 20915 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See generally
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The
Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOL. L.Q. 181
(1986).
7. See, e.g., TanglewoodE. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849
F.2d 1568, 18 ELR 21348 (5th Cir. 1988); Sand Springs Home v.
Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 17 ELR 20775 (N.D. Okla.
1987); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348,
15 ELR 20577 (D. Del. 1985).
8. See, e.g., United States v. NewCastle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258,16
ELR 21007 (D. Del. 1986); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc.,
616 F. Supp. 27, 15 ELR 20346 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Colorado v.
ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 15 ELR 20523 (D. Col. 1985);
Chem -Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 802. Courts alternatively found a
basis for implying a right of contribution under the provisions of
§ 107 or generally under federal common law.
9. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77
(1981). In light of these cases, the Supreme Court in Cooper Indus.
characterized the implied right of contribution under CERCLA as
"debatable." Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Serv., 543 U.S. 157, 162, 34
ELR 20154 (2004).
10. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The legislative history for
SARA indicates Congress' intent to "clarify" and "confirm" a right
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provided two express provisions authorizing contribution.
Section 113(f)(1), titled "Contribution," provided that any
person could seek contribution from any other PRPs "dur-
ing or following" any civil action under §§106 or 107." Ad-
ditionally, § 1 13(f)(3)(B) provided that persons who had re-
solved all or part of their liability to the United States or a
state "in an administratively or judicially approved settle-
ment" may seek contribution from nonsettling PRPs.12
Thus, following the 1986 SARA Amendments, CERCLA
contained two possible causes of action for PRPs who had
incurred response costs: a direct cost recovery action under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) and an action for contribution under § 113(f).
The Supreme Court described these two sections as creating
"similar and somewhat overlapping" remedies.13
There were at least three possible consequences arising
from the choice of cause of action. First, liability under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) had generally been found to be joint and sev-
eral while courts, in a contribution action under §113(f),
were to "equitably allocate" costs among PRPs. In other
words, the implication was that plaintiffs bringing an action
under § 107(a) would be entitled to recover all of their re-
sponse costs, while plaintiffs suing in contribution under
§l13(f) would only be entitled to recover an equitable por-
tion of their costs.
Second, § 113(g) provided separate statutes of limitations
for actions brought under §§ 107 and 113. Section 1 13(g)(2)
provided a three- or six-year statute of limitations for ac-
tions brought under § 107 measured from the date of com-
pletion of a removal action or initiation of on-site remedi-
ation work for a remediation action.14 In contrast,
of contribution under CERCLA. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-253,
pt. I. at 59, 79 (1985).
11. 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1). Section 1 13(f)(1) can be charitably described
as oddly drafted. In relevant part it provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of
this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such
claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed
by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a
civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of
this title.
42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1). Whereas the first sentence implies that aright
of contribution can arise only "during or following" a civil action,
the last sentence seems to imply a right of contribution "in the ab-
sence of a civil action." This confusion was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Serv., 543 U.S. 157, 34 ELR 20154
(2004), which held that the first sentence meant what it said. Sec-
tion 113(f)(1) created an express right of contribution that could
be asserted only during or following a civil action brought under




Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809,816, 24 ELR 20955
(1994).
14. Section 113(g)(2)(A) provides a three-year statute of limitations for
recovery of costs incurred in removal actions measured from the date
of completion of the removal action. 42 U.S.C. §9613(g)(2)(A). Sec-
tion 1 13(g)(2)(B) provides a six-year statute of limitations for reme-
dial actions measured from the initiation of "physical on-site con-
struction." 42 U.S.C. §9613(g)(2)(B). If the remedial action is com-
menced within three years of completion of a removal action, the re-
moval action costs may be recovered in the action brought under the
six-year statute of limitations to recover remedial action costs. 42
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§ l1l3(g)(3) provided a three-year statute of limitations for
actions under § 113 measured from the date of entry ofjudg-
ment or settlement.5
Finally, Congress, in § 113(f)(2), had provided "contribu-
tion protection" for persons that entered settlement agree-
ments with the government.'6 Contribution protection en-
couraged settlement by providing some certainty of the ex-
tent of liability of settling parties. Settling parties would not
only resolve their liability to the government, but also get
protection from imposition of additional costs by non-
settling parties who might otherwise sue them for contribu-
tion. There was some concern following SARA that PRPs
could avoid the consequences of contribution protection by
suing for cost recovery under § 107(a)(4)(B), rather than
contribution under §113(f).' 7
Courts of appeal dealt with the §§107 and 113 issue by
uniformly holding that PRPs could sue only under § 113(f).'8
In general, the courts held that an action amongjointly liable
PRPs was a "quintessential" action for contribution and
therefore governed by § 113. ' These holdings had the neat
consequence of eliminating a choice of causes of action by
PRPs and ensuring the integrity of contribution protection.
No court of appeals precluded a PRP from seeking cost re-
covery, and PRPs had been allowed to seek contribution re-
gardless ofwhether they had incurred costs following a gov-
emment settlement, government order, or voluntarily.20 The
effect of these decisions was simply to allocate PRPs' ac-
tions to § 113.21
II. The Cooper Revolution
In Cooper Industries,22 the Supreme Court rocked the estab-
lished view of CERCLA. Cooper Industries began as a gar-
den-variety CERCLA action. Aviall was the current land-
owner that, after some pressure from the state, undertook a
U.S.C. §9613(g)(2)(B). In general, "removal" actions are defined as
shorter term, immediate responses; "remedial" actions generally are
longer term, permanent responses. Compare 42 U.S.C. §9601(23)
(definition of "removal"), with 42 U.S.C. §9601(24) (definition of
"remedial"). The term "response action" is defined to include both
removal and remedial actions. 42 U.S.C. §9601(25).
15. 42 U.S.C. §9613(g)(3).
16. 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(2). This section provides that persons who en-
tered into settlements with the government "shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters address in the settlement."
42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(2). Section 122(g)(5) provides comparable con-
tribution protection for de minimis party settlements. 42 U.S.C.
§9622(g)(5).
17. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d
1298, 1304, 27 ELR 21211 (9th Cir. 1997).
18. Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Serv., 543 U.S. 157, 586, 34 ELR
20154 (2004) (citing cases).
19. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24, 29 ELR
20229 (2d Cir. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Crofton Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. G&H Partnership,
258 F.3d 292, 31 ELR 20841 (4th Cir. 2001) (right of contribution
following state-ordered cleanup); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap
Iron & Metal Co., 153 F.3d 344, 29 ELR 20065 (6th Cir. 1999) (right
of contribution following federal administrative order); Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Co., 118 F.3d 1298, 27 ELR 21211 (9th
Cir. 1998) (right of contribution following voluntary cleanup).
21. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in its opinion in At-
lantic Research, characterized these cases as "directing traffic" be-
tween §§ 107 and 113. Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, 459
F.3d 827, 832, 36 ELR 20164 (8th Cir. 2006).
22. 543 U.S. at 157.
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cleanup of its property. Although it had contributed to some
of the contamination, the prior owner, Cooper Industries,
also had released hazardous substances at the site. Aviall
sued Cooper Industries in federal district court seeking,
among other things, cost recovery under CERCLA. The dis-
trict court, however, dismissed the CERCLA claim holding
that Aviall did not have an action for contribution under
§1 13(f)(1) since it had not incurred costs "during or follow-
ing" a civil action as provided in § 113(f)(1). 23 This decision
was affirmed by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, but then reversed in a 10-3 decision by the
Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.24 The en banc decision held that
a PRP who had incurred response costs had a right of contri-
bution under § 113(f) even in the absence of a civil action.
Despite the fact that there was no split in the circuits on this
issue, the Supreme Court, at the urging of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ), granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that a right of contribution under
§ 1 13(f)(1) was only available "during or following" a civil
action under CERCLA.25 Although the majority opinion,
written by Justice Clarence Thomas, was endorsed by seven
Justices, all nine agreed that an action for contribution under
§113(f)(1) could only be brought during or following a civil
action. In other words, PRPs who had voluntarily cleanedup
property had no right of contribution under CERCLA. The
majority declined to consider whether an alternative right of
cost recovery existed under § 107(a)(4)(B) or whether there
was an implied right contribution available to PRPs not eli-
gible for contribution under § 113(f). Rather, the Court re-
manded the case for further consideration of these issues.26
Two Justices, in dissent, would have affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit en banc decision based on their conclusion that § 107
provided an alternative cause of action.27
Cooper Industries created something of a firestorm
within the environmental world. The decision had elimi-
nated a right of contribution under § 113 by PRPs who vol-
untarily incurred cleanup costs; prior court of appeals deci-
sions had eliminated the right of PRPs to sue under § 107.
Thus, there was considerable doubt as to whether, following
Cooper Industries, PRPs who voluntarily cleaned up prop-
erty had any federal cause of action under CERCLA to re-
cover some portion of cleanup costs from other PRPs.
III. Atlantic Research to the Rescue
Within two years of the decision in Cooper Industries, four
courts of appeals had issued opinions addressing the issue of
whether PRPs had a cause of action under § 107. Unanimous
opinions in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,28
23. Aviall Serv. v. Cooper Indus., 2000 WL 31730 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
24. Aviall Serv. v. Cooper Indus., 263 F.3d 134, 32 ELR 20069 (5th Cir.
2001).
25. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 168.
26. Id. at 170. The majority also declined to consider whether parties
who clean up in response to a government administrative order had a
right of contribution under §113(f)(1). Id. at 167 n.5.
27. Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent, authoredby Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Al-
though the dissent clearly found a cause of action under § 107(a), it
was somewhat ambiguous as to whether this cause of action arose as
a right of contribution or a direct right of cost recovery. See id. at 170.
28. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,29 and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit30 held that
PRPs who voluntarily cleaned up property could seek cost
recovery under § 107. In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that PRPs could not sue
under § 107, and thus PRPs who voluntarily clean up prop-
erty had no cause of action under CERCLA.31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
Eighth Circuit opinion inAtlantic Research. The Eighth Cir-
cuit opinion was an interesting choice for two reasons. First,
the Eighth Circuit had found a right of cost recovery under
two alternative theories. The court held that PRPs either had
a direct right of cost recovery under the plain language of
§107(a)(4)(B) or as an implied right of contribution arising
from § 107. This assured that the Supreme Court would con-
sider the full range of arguments in support of a PRP action
under § 107. Second, the defendant in Atlantic Research was
the federal government. The DOJ had, since Cooper Indus-
tries, argued that there was no right of cost recovery for
PRPs who voluntarily clean up property. One conspiracy
theory held that the government's position was motivated
by a desire to eliminate cost recovery actions against the
government. Whatever the motivation, the DOJ argued in
Atlantic Research that PRPs had no cause of action un-
der §107.
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, held that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) expressly provided a direct right of cost re-
covery by PRPs.32 Section 107(a) provides that PRPs are lia-
ble to: (1) government entities; and (2) to "any other per-
son," and the government argued that "any other person" re-
ferred to persons other than PRPs. The Court gave this argu-
ment short shrift, stating that it made "little textual sense."33
Noting the parallel construction of §§107(a)(4)(A) and
107(a)(4)(B), the Court concluded that the reference to "any
other person" distinguished those "persons," including
PRPs, who could sue under § 107(a)(4)(B), from the govern-
ment entities, themselves defined in the statute as persons,
who could sue under §107(a)(4)(A).34 Further, the Court
noted that, given the broad scope of the class of PRPs, "vir-
tually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs" were likely
to be PRPs, and, thus, if PRPs could not sue under § 107, it
was "unclear what party would."35 Noting that there was
some redundancy in their construction since § 107(a)(4)(B)
provided that those "other persons" could only recover
"other costs," Justice Thomas noted that it is "appropriate to
tolerate a degree of surplusage rather than adopt a textually
dubious construction that threatens to render the entire pro-
vision a nullity." 36
The existence of separate causes of action under § 107(a)
and §113(f) would not, in the Court's view, provide PRPs
29. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North
Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824,37 ELR20010 (7th
Cir. 2007).
30. Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827,823, 36ELR
20164 (8th Cir. 2006).
31. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 36
ELR 20180 (3d Cir. 2006).
32. United States v. Atlantic Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2335-37, 37
ELR 20139 (2007).
33. Id. at 2336.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2337.
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with a choice of cause of action since the sections estab-
lished "complementary yet distinct" rights.37 The Court
based this distinction, in part, on the "traditional sense" of
common-law contribution.38 Quoting Black's Law Dictio-
nary, the Court described contribution as a tortfearsor's
right to collect from others responsible for the same tort af-
ter the tortfeasor "has paid more than his or her proportion-
ate share."39 Where a PRP had paid more than its share of an
existing obligation, either through a judgment in a § 107
civil action or by paying money to the government in a set-
tlement agreement, its action against other PRPs was a con-
tribution action subject to §113(f).40 In contrast, §107(a)
"permits cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a
party that has incurred cleanup costs."41 In the Court's view,
a party who pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or court
judgment "does not incur its own costs ofresponse. Rather it
reimburses other parties for costs that those parties have in-
curred."42 Thus, parties who directly incur costs are subject
to § 107(a); parties who reimburse others for previously in-
curred response costs are limited to an action for contribu-
tion under § 113(f).43 Given this clear distinction, parties
would be subject to the appropriate statute of limitations and
liability standard determined by whether their action arose
under §§107 or 113.
The Court also dealt with two other concerns arising from
a PRP's right of cost recovery under § 107. First, the Court
considered the consequence of providing for joint and sev-
eral liability in action by a PRP under §107(a)(4)(B). Al-
though the standard of liability might be joint and several, a
direct cost recovery action under § 107 would not, in the
Court's view, entitle a PRP to recover an inequitable share of
costs. Defendant PRPs in such an action could file a coun-
terclaim for contribution against the plaintiff under § l13(f),
and this would allow the court to equitably allocate costs be-
tween them.44 Therefore, whether the action arises under
§§ 107 or 113, courts would have the power to equitably al-
locate costs among PRPs.
Second, the Court considered the effect of a direct right of
cost recovery under § 107 on the "contribution protection"
afforded to settling parties under § 107(f)(2). Although the
Court acknowledged that the contribution protection provi-
sion "does not by its terms protect against cost-recovery lia-
bility under § 107(a)," the Court doubted that this "supposed
loophole" would discourage settlement.45 Since courts
could allocate costs based on equitable principles, a court
"would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement as part of
the liability calculus."46 Further, settling PRPs still would
obtain significant protection from contribution sought by
other PRPs. Finally, settling PRPs would also obtain the "in-
herent benefit" of finally resolving its liability to the govern-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2338.




43. In a critical footnote, discussed infra, the Court acknowledged that
this analysis created the possibility that under certain circumstances
there might still be an overlap between §§107 and 113. Id. at 2338
n.6.
44. Id. at 2339.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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ment. In light of these continuing benefits, the Court
thought that permitting PRPs to seek cost recovery under
§ 107 would not "eviscerate" the contribution protection set
forth in § 113(f)(2).
In light of its conclusion that § 107(a)(4)(B) provides an
express right of cost recovery, the Court stated that it
"need not address" the alternative holding of the Court of
Appeals that § 107 contains an additional implied right of
contribution for PRPs not eligible to seek contribution
under §113(f).48
IV. Clarity and Confusion Following Atlantic
Research
A. What Is Clear: Voluntary Cleanups and
Reimbursement
Afew basic points are clear following Atlantic Research and
Cooper Industries. PRPs who voluntarily cleanup property
have a direct right of cost recovery under § 107(a)(4)(B), and
they may not sue in contribution under § l13(f). Their § 107
action is subject to the three- or six-year statutes of limita-
tion specified in § 113(g)(2). Although their initial action
may be based onjoint and several liability, courts may equi-
tably allocate costs if the defendant properly counterclaims
under §113(f)(1).
In contrast, PRPs who have reimbursed the government
or other PRPs for previously incurred response costs fol-
lowing either a civil judgment or government settlement
may sue for contribution under § l13(f). Such a contribu-
tion action will be subject to the three-year statute of limi-
tations provision of § 13(g)(3). In a §113(f) contribution
action, the court will have the authority to equitably allo-
cate costs.
B. What Is Less Clear: Response Costs Following a
Unilateral Administrative Order or Settlement
There are two circumstances not addressed in either Cooper
Industries or Atlantic Research in which PRPs may incur
costs they wish to recover under CERCLA: costs incurred
in response to a government administrative order and costs
incurred for remedial work under a settlement agreement.
Under the Court's analysis in Atlantic Research, it is likely,
but not certain, that courts will conclude that such costs
may only be recovered through an action under
§107(a)(4)(B). Limiting cost recovery in these circum-
stances creates some procedural problems, but also neatly
addresses any problems regarding the applicable statute
of limitations.
1. Costs Incurred Under an Administrative Order
Under CERCLA, persons may be subject to a unilateral ad-
ministrative order (UAO) issued by the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency under § 106 that compels them, with
draconian consequences for noncompliance, to take speci-
fied response actions. In Cooper Industries, the Supreme
Court expressly declined to consider whether PRPs who
incurred costs in response to a UAO could sue for contribu-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2339 n.8.
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tion under §113(f)(1).49 Subsequent courts concluded that
they could not.0
Compulsory cleanups are, however, significantly differ-
ent from voluntary cleanups. Unlike voluntary cleanups,
cleanups in response to a formal UAO are obviously under-
taken under government compulsion, and, in a real sense,
extinguish possible liability of other PRPs by eliminating
the basis for further government action. In this respect, there
is an argument to be made that compulsory cleanups, unlike
voluntary cleanups, justify a right of contribution under tra-
ditional common-law concepts.
Nonetheless, both the language of § 113(f) and the Court's
analysis in Atlantic Research indicate that costs incurred in
response to a UAO may only be recovered in an action under
§ 107(a). First, a right of contribution under § 113 (f)(1) arises
only during or following a civil action. As several courts
have held, a UAO is simply not a civil action, and therefore,
under the plain language reading of the Court in Cooper In-
dustries, it is hard to claim that there is an express right of
contribution created by §113(f)(1). Second, the Court's
logic in Atlantic Research almost compels this conclusion.
In the Court's view, contribution arises only if a tortfeasor
has paid or reimbursed a party for previously established lia-
bilities. Persons who directly expend costs for remediation,
rather than reimbursing others, have incurred costs within
the meaning of §107(a). Since parties subject o a UAO di-
rectly incur response costs and do not reimburse expendi-
tures made by others, their cause of action is likely to arise
exclusively under § 107(a)(4)(B). Limiting their cause of ac-
tion to § 107(a) is also, as discussed below, consistent with
the statute of limitations provisions of § 113(g).
2. Costs Incurred Under a Settlement Agreement
A far more problematic issue is the appropriate cause of ac-
tion available to PRPs who have incurred response costs by
undertaking remediation under the terms of an approved set-
tlement agreement. In footnote six ofAtlantic Research, the
Court identified this circumstance as one in which their may
be overlapping remedies under §§ 107 and 113. The Court
stated that
we recognize that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant
to a consent decree following a suit under §106 or
§ 107(a). In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs
voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another
party. We do not decide whether these compelled
costs of response are recoverable under §113(f),
§ 107(a), or both.5
Although the plain language of § 113(f)(3)(B) suggests that
these costs can be recovered in a contribution action, both
the logic of Atlantic Research and the statute of limitations
provisions of § 113(g) suggest hat PRPs seeking to recover
these costs will be limited to an action under § 107.
Consider a typical situation addressed in a settlement
agreement. In most cases, the government will have in-
curred some response costs investigating or taking initial re-
sponse actions at a site. A settlement will generally involve
49. Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Serv., 543 U.S. 157, 168 n.5.
50. See, e.g., Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d
1136 (D. Kan. 2006); Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisi-
tion LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Ill. 2005).
51. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 n.6,
37 ELR 20139 (2007) (citation omitted).
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an agreement by settling PRPs both to reimburse the gov-
emment for its past costs and to undertake further response
actions at the site.
There seems no doubt that, under §113(f)(3)(B), PRPs
who have reimbursed the government may seek contribution
from nonsettling PRPs to recover portions of these costs.
The problem arises as to the proper cause of action for
costs directly incurred by a PRP to remediate a site under the
terms of a settlement agreement. The language of
§l 13(f)(3)(B) suggests that it provides a right of contribu-
tion for these costs. Section 113(f)(3)(B) provides a right of
contribution to a party who has "resolved its liability to the
United States or a State for some or all of a response action
or some or all of its costs of such action" in a proper settle-
ment agreement. The language of this section certainly
suggests a right of contribution by parties who have either
(1) reimbursed the government for "some or all of [the gov-
emment's] costs or (2) agreed to undertake a further re-
sponse action and therefore resolved the parties' liability to
the government for "some or all of a response action." The
Court, however, stated that Congress, when it used the word
contribution, intended to use it in its traditional sense.
Therefore, it is possible that he right of contribution under
§l 13(f)(3)(B) might not extend to costs directly incurred in
an agreed response action.
Furthermore, the logic ofAtlantic Research suggests that
such costs are not recoverable in an action for contribution.
In the Court's view, contribution arises when a party has re-
imbursed others and cost recovery arises when a person has
directly incurred response costs. The Court suggested that
this neat dichotomy might result in overlapping causes of
action for costs incurred under a settlement agreement.
The provisions of the statute of limitations in § 113(g)
may justify avoiding any overlap of causes of action. The
provisions of § 113(g) expressly distinguish between actions
for contribution under § 113 and actions for cost recovery
under §107. Under §113(g)(3), an action for contribution
must be brought within three years after entry of judgment
or administrative order. This time period makes sense if the
settlement requires payment of past costs; it makes less
sense if the settlement requires performance of on-site re-
medial work that may not be completed within three years
of settlement.
In contrast, § 1 13(g)(2), applicable to cost recovery under
§ 107, establishes a statute of limitations measured from the
date of completion of certain on-site remediation work. This
obviously makes ense when the costs that are being recov-
ered involve construction or other remedial work that may
be continuing long after the date of settlement. In the pre-
Cooper Industries world, a number of courts that had lim-
ited PRPs to an action for contribution under § 113 had found
it necessary to apply the §107 statute of limitations to ac-
tions brought under § 113.52 This was done through some
creative, and somewhat artificial, characterizations of the
relationship between §§107 and 113. No other option was
possible given the unavailability of a PRP right of cost re-
covery under § 107 and the inapplicability of the contribu-
tion statute of limitations to actions involving on-site reme-
dial work.
52. See, e.g., Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 31
ELR 20369 (5th Cir. 2000); Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124
F.3d 1187, 27 ELR 21465 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Following Atlantic Research, however, PRPs directly in-
curring response costs now have a cause of action under
§ 107. Limiting parties who directly incur response costs,
whether voluntarily, pursuant o a UAO, or pursuant to set-
tlement agreement, to an action under § 107 rationalizes
the application ofthe § 113(g) statute of limitations with-
out the artifices employed by earlier cases. It is consis-
tent with the Court's rationale and a credible construc-
tion of § 13(f)(3)(B). An exclusive cause of action under
§ 107 simply makes more sense that some alternative over-
lapping remedy.
Procedurally, there would be no problem in pleading two
causes of action; past costs paid under a settlement agree-
ment would be clearly distinguishable from remediation
costs incurred complying with the terms of the agreement.
There would, however, be one consequence arising from the
application of the statutes of limitation provisions them-
selves. Under § 13(f)(3), settling parties must bring an ac-
tion for contribution within three years of settlement. At that
point, they may still be incurring response costs as part of re-
medial work. This means that settling PRPs might be forced
to bring an initial contribution action to recover the costs
they have paid the government and a subsequent cost recov-
ery action addressing their response costs.
This may be a consequence but not a concern. It is com-
mon in CERCLA practice to bring an initial action to estab-
lish the liability of the defendants prior to incurring all re-
sponse costs. An initial § 113 action would also include a
claim under § 107 for the costs that have been initially in-
curred. Adetermination of liability at that point would facil-
itate settlement ofthose future costs. Indeed, the only conse-
quence ofthis approach would be a requirement hat settling
PRPs file their initial action within three years of settlement
or risk losing the right of contribution for the amounts paid
to the government.
C. What Is Wrong: Contribution Protection
The most troubling part of the Court's analysis in Atlantic
Research was its cavalier treatment of "contribution protec-
tion." As noted, Congress provided for contribution protec-
tion under § 113(f)(2) to encourage settlement by limiting
the liability of settling parties. Prior to Cooper Industries,
one reason that courts had limited PRPs to an action for con-
tribution was to preserve this incentive; if PRPs can only sue
for contribution, then "contribution protection" protects set-
tling PRPs from all CERCLA claims by nonsettling PRPs.53
With the resurrection of a distinct right of cost recovery in
§ 107(a)(4)(B), Atlantic Research also resurrected the issue
of whether contribution protection would also bar § 107
claims by nonsettling parties.
In Atlantic Research, however, the Supreme Court, with
virtually no analysis, indicated that contribution protec-
tion under §113(f)(2) would not preclude an action for
cost recovery under § 107(a). The Court's entire treatment
of this issue was its observation that § 113(f)(2) "does not
by its terms protect against cost recovery liability under
section 107"; it characterizes this as a "supposed loop-
hole."54 Although the Court "doubts" that its conclusion
53. See, e.g., Sun Co., Inc. (R&M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d
1187, 27 ELR 21465 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d
1111, 27 ELR 21075 (3d Cir. 1997).
54. Atlantic Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339.
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will "eviscerate" settlement incentives, the Court clearly
underestimates the consequence of the loss of contribu-
tion protection.
The Court indicated that trial courts will "undoubtedly"
take the settlement into account in allocating liability in
any §107 action. The Court may not have doubts, but in a
trial in which parties are allowed to present evidence relat-
ing to equitable allocation, it is far from certain that a set-
tling PRP can be assured that it will not be required to pay
more than the amount specified in the government settle-
ment. Settlement will thus not buy the certainty as to the
settling party's liability than previously provided by con-
tribution protection.
Even if trial courts will generally limit liability based on
past settlement agreements, there is another significant con-
sequence of the loss of contribution protection. It is one
thing to have a defense to liability through "contribution
protection" and thus be able to avoid litigation through a
motion for summary judgment. It is quite another to be sub-
ject to liability under § 107 and therefore be required to pro-
ceed through trial in the hopes of a final equitable allocation
by the court.
This problem need not arise. In the years following
adoption of §113(f)(2), a number of courts extended con-
tribution protection to bar nonsettling PRPs from asserting
a variety of claims against settling parties.5 6 One court, ad-
dressing the argument that contribution protection should
not bar a claim for "independent cost recovery," stated, the
"words of the contribution bar such claims no matter what
they are called."5 7
In the oral argument in Atlantic Research, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg identified this simple solution. She sug-
gested that to "harmonize" §§107 and 113, courts could
"honor the agreement" between the settling parties and the
government by barring actions under §§ 107 and 113. In her
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., City and City of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp.
340 (D. Colo. 1993) (settlement bars "response cost" claim as well as
claim for contribution); Davro Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Neb. 1992) (contribution protection provided to de minimis party
settlements under §122(g)(5) bars "independent response cost
claim" cost recovery by nonsettling party for costs incurred in re-
sponse to administrative order). See also United States v. Cannons
Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79,92,20 ELR 20845 (1st Cir. 1990) (section
113(f)(2) also bars claims for indemnification by nonsettling par-
ties).
57. Davro Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. at 1189.
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words, "If someone has settled and is protected by virtue of
the settlement, then when someone else tries to go after that
same person the court could say: We have to make the stat-
ute work and we're going to honor the settlement."58
The Court, through its narrow "traditional" characteriza-
tion of contribution, has made it more difficult to extend
contribution protection to § 107 claims, but it is not a great
stretch to say both that a § 107 cost recovery claim has suffi-
cient characteristics of contribution to justify its bar under
§1 13(f)(2).59 In fact, the Court specifically stated that it did
not reach the question of whether PRPs had an "implied
right of contribution" under § 107.60 If such an implied right
of contribution were found to exist, it would be no great
stretch to conclude that the contribution bar precluded a
§ 107 contribution claim. The problem, of course, is the
Court's identification of an express right of cost recovery
under § 107 independent of any such implied right. Perhaps,
the Court's preservation ofthe possibility of an implied right
contribution is enough of an opening for future courts to
conclude that contribution protection also bars § 107 claims.
Whatever the rationale, extension of contribution protec-
tion to PRP claims under § 107 would complete the return to
those preexisting, happy days of a stable understanding of
CERCLA liability.
V. Conclusion
Atlantic Research was an important step in ensuring that the
remedial objectives of CERCLA are satisfied. By providing
PRPs a mechanism to ensure an equitable allocation of
cleanup costs, the Court preserved an incentive to voluntary
cleanup. The lingering uncertainties in the opinion can be
resolved to create a coherent set of rights to cost recovery
that reconciles the different parts of this notoriously confus-
ing and complex statute.
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, United States v. Atlantic Re-
search Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007) (No. 06-562), available athttp:II
supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06-
562.pdf.
59. Several courts had applied contribution protection to bar §107
claims by nonsettling parties because, in their view, a cost recovery
action was essentially an action for contribution. See, e.g., United
States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 23 ELR 21493 (D. Colo.
1993); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A&Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp.
1079, 25 ELR 21493 (D.N.J. 1992).
60. Atlantic Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339 n.8.
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